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Banking regulation towards advisory:  
the “culture compliance” of banks and supervisory authorities
1 
 
abstract 
The financial regulation is moreover based on self-regulation and the coordination of external 
and internal supervision. This determines an evolution in the role played by the supervisory 
authorities, and in the manner in which they interact - with and almost advisory function - 
with the governance bodies of the banks, such as the board of directors, top management and 
external and internal auditors. The capacity to adequately perform such advisory functions 
entails the existence of consistent objectives, consistent knowledge and consistent cultural 
models. Our paper points at cultural gaps as a possible stumbling block in the efficient 
exchange of information and the sharing of problems and goals among regulators and the 
industry. We develop a cultural survey based on the application of a text-analysis model to a 
corpus of reference texts produced by two samples, drawn from among the supervisory bodies 
and the supervised entities. The empirical survey results reveal numerous fields of cultural 
differentiation, alongside several important areas in which the orientations of the two parties 
tend to overlap. 
Keywords: Financial Regulation; Banking Culture; Cultural Compliance 
                                                 
1
 The paper draws from and further develops the considerations on the issue presented and discussed at 
numerous conferences and seminars, in particular by the Rosselli Foundation, the Italian Academy of Corporate 
Economics, the Bank of Italy. 
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Foreword 
 
This paper identifies cultural gaps as a possible stumbling block in the efficient exchange of 
information and the sharing of problems and goals among regulators and the industry, with 
respect to the recent innovations introduced in the financial sector, which are orienting the 
supervisory authorities towards the adoption of new relationship models with the supervised 
financial intermediares.  
 
In greater detail, the paper describes how financial supervisory models have evolved towards 
solutions based on increasing cooperation between the regulators and financial intermediaries 
(§ 1). This has led to the definition of a new role for the supervisory authorities, which, in 
parallel, encourages the innovation of the organizational tools employed for communicating 
and exchanging information with the supervised entities (§ 2). These tools are classified and 
analyzed, with respect to their field of application and their connections with the single 
supervised fields (§ 3). Consequently, there emerges the importance of enhancing the 
development of a consistent knowledge base and cultural models shared by the supervisory 
bodies and the supervised entities, which justifies the in-depth assessment of the current 
extent of the cultural gap between the two stakeholders. The paper then presents a cultural 
survey, based on the application of a text-analysis model to a corpus of reference texts 
produced by two samples, drawn from among the supervisory bodies and the supervised 
entities (§ 4). The empirical survey results reveal numerous fields of cultural differentiation, 
alongside several important areas in which the orientations of the two parties tend to overlap 
(§ 5). 
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1. Recent trends in supervisory models 
 
The issue of banking regulation is at the centre of an important international debate, with 
respect to its role and the modalities in which the supervisory functions are exercised. 
 
Generally speaking, the supervisory authorities’ actions are based on a rather broad and 
complex system of activities and instruments. The survey by the World Bank on the 
regulation and supervision of banks in 107 countries comprises twelve separate parts, 
covering the following aspects of a country’s banking system: domestic and foreign bank 
entry, government ownership of banks, capital adequacy, restrictions on bank activities, 
supervisory power, independence, resources, loan classification stringency, provisioning 
standards, diversification guidelines, deposit insurance system, provisioning and risk 
management requirements, information disclosure requirements, crisis management (Barth, 
Caprio, Levine, 2001).  
 
In the last few years the regulation of banks and financial intermediaries has changed 
radically, becoming increasingly indirect (from structural regulation to prudential and 
consensual regulation and self-regulation)
2
.  
 
According to the first empirical assessments, the most effective supervisory policies in 
ensuring improved conditions of stability and enhanced performance appear to be those aimed 
at promoting “private” supervision, by means of transparent and significant accounting and 
information disclosure requirements, principles of governance and management control, 
common criteria of sound and prudent management (Barth, Caprio, Levine, 2001b and 1999).  
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 For further information on the issue, see Gualandri 2001, and Carretta, Schwizer and Stefanelli 2003. 
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In the consensual regulatory approach, which reduces outside intervention in a bank’s 
management, a reduction of the regulatory costs incurred by the intermediary can be 
discerned (Elliehausen 1998). This occurs if the supervisory action is effective in promoting 
and encouraging the adoption of internal control systems. Building a mindful and responsible 
management, through mechanisms of self-analysis and self-control, enhances the possibility 
of pursuing “economies of scale and scope”, in terms of the broadness of the benefits 
descending from regulation, and of the reduction of the time needed to adapt to it. 
 
The efficacy of this arrangement primarily depends on the level of competition in the 
financial market. In high competition, operators become more sensitive to the judgement of 
the market, and are therefore encouraged to adopt a “virtuous” management approach, within 
a self-regulatory framework. Moreover, this approach encourages the development of a 
supervisory culture, which can then become a powerful tool for guiding individual actions 
towards the achievement of sound and prudent management. The latter is also subject to the 
supervisory bodies’ actual capacity to get to know and guide the management behaviour of 
the supervised entities, taking account of the differences existing among them, in terms of 
shareholding structure, size, and business activities (Carretta, 1998). This is no easy task, 
which requires a determined re-orientation of supervisory activities towards the production 
and organizational processes of the supervised entities; the use, for this purpose, of all the 
available information; and the development, by the supervisory bodies, of a banking culture 
(which unquestionably differs from the traditional regulatory culture), which can be achieved 
also by means of further efforts in collecting information and broadening its knowledge base.  
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In any case, within a more balanced supervisory framework, it is important to achieve the 
improved clarity of a microprudential view, i.e. a focus on the behaviour of the individual 
financial intermediaries, to balance the current trend that focuses on a macroprduential view, 
which, by itself, might be viewed as too abstract and distant from the actual market 
behaviours (Carretta, 1998).   
 
In fact, in recent years the supervisory authorities have focused increasingly on how the 
financial intermediaries organize the production, administration and distribution processes of 
the respective business areas, and have intervened by establishing principles and rules aimed 
at promoting suitable corporate organizations (Pisanti, 2002). They interact with the 
supervised entities, encouraging the improvement of the organizational and internal control 
processes, according to a certificatory, rather than strictly regulatory, approach. They have 
become consultants of the financial institutions, thus helping to spread knowledge of the best 
practises: supervision and management support are becoming more and more intertwined, 
with a view to achieving stability and efficiency, by encouraging sound and prudent 
management practises. From this point of view, the search for cultural consistency between 
the supervisory authorities and the financial industry is an important objective for improving 
supervisory activities. 
 
 
2. Moving towards a new role for supervisory authorities  
 
The implementation of new supervisory arrangements, based on self-regulation and the 
coordination of external and internal supervision, determines an evolution in the role played 
by the supervisory authorities, and in the manner in which they interact with the governance 
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bodies of the banks, such as the board of directors, top management and external and internal 
auditors.  
 
Delegating supervision by the supervisory authorities to the supervised entities entails the 
capacity, by the former, to define the minimum objective compliance requirements for the 
internal control systems (Banca d’Italia, 1998; 2002), while at the same time encouraging 
organizational and management decision-making that is compatible with the supervision 
objectives. The aim of the regulatory intervention also includes developing the banks’ ability 
to avoid fraudulent behaviour, which is capable of jeopardizing their stability, and that of the 
system as a whole, encouraging the intermediaries’ attitude to constantly adapt their 
production processes to strategic decisions that are consistent with market evolution, and fine-
tuning the corporate governance bodies’ ability to take on the various types of risk related to 
operating and financial innovation.  
 
This new supervisory arrangement requires that compliance with the criterion of sound and 
prudent management - pursued through the functionality and adequacy of the internal control 
systems - must become a rule of conduct for intermediaries, that is, an intermediate objective 
capable of combining the approach of both the supervisory bodies and the supervised entities: 
for the supervisory authority, the first guarantee of a sound and prudent management resides 
in a business’ capacity of prevention and intervention, by means of an appropriate internal 
control system. On the other hand, the management itself must reach more or less the same 
conclusion: greater capacity of governance is required because of the increased exposure of 
banks to new and old risks, in consequence of the opportunities granted to each business 
under the new regulatory framework (De Maio, Patalano, 1995). 
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This overlapping of the objectives of both the supervisors and the supervised, by increasing 
the degree of consistency between the regulatory principles, on the one hand, and the 
intermediaries’ management criteria, on the other hand, will in all likelihood lessen the weight 
of the restrictions and the measures introduced by the regulatory authorities (Airoldi, 2002).  
 
Furthermore, the revised Basel Accord on Capital (Basel 2) envisages the possibility for 
banks to adopt internal procedures for assessing asset requirements, with respect to credit and 
operational risks, like in the previous Accord of 1988 on market risk. Moreover, the banks 
opting for an internal approach to credit and operational risk management for supervisory 
purposes must provide evidence, to the supervisory authority, that they are capable of meeting 
a set of minimum requirements, on an ongoing basis. These requirements may be identified, 
inter alia, in the management’s attitude to ensure widespread communication of its corporate 
strategy and risk management policies, aimed at the creation of a risk culture; in the structured 
interaction between the management itself and the risk control units, with a view to pursuing 
the implementation of criteria relating to control system efficiency, adequacy of resources, 
and efficacy of corrective measures, vis-à-vis any shortcomings identified by the control 
procedures put into place. Therefore, banks are required to systematically map the activities 
most exposed to the risks in question, and to develop suitable procedures aimed at 
consistently assess expected losses over a certain period of time. These must be reported in 
historical data series, subject to appropriate back-testing. Banks are also required to adopt 
their risk measurement methods in decision making and day-to-day management activities.  
 
The internal risk management models must be preventively approved by the supervisory 
authorities. The procedure aims at making sure that they take account of both corporate needs 
and the minimum requirements laid down by the authority, representing a solution achieved 
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by “mutual consent”, so to speak, resulting from a dialogue between the supervisors and the 
supervised. In this case too the standard-making proposals feature a supervisory approach 
based on a bilateral dialogue, grounded on the gradual “delegation” of supervision from the 
supervisory body to the supervised entity, and on the transition from an approach based on the 
“supervision of activities” to one based on the “supervision of controls”. In encouraging 
intermediaries to adopt the advanced approaches, due to the possibility of achieving benefits, 
in terms of the regulatory capital, the regulations promote improved responsibility and 
awareness, with respect to the actual corporate risk levels. Therefore, the Basel Committee 
highlights that the prudential control process acknowledges the bank management’s 
responsibility in developing an internal risk assessment process, and in establishing asset 
objectives commensurate with the bank’s risk profile and control structure. The type of 
control that is gaining ground at supranational level, therefore, fosters general self-regulation 
mechanisms, which does not mean self-determination of the rules, but the independent 
management of the rules established externally and inspired by the best practises within the 
industry.  
 
To approve the internal control procedures proposed by the banks, it is not possible to build 
an automatic process, but it is necessary to put into place a set of competencies and 
benchmarks capable of ascertaining the supervisor’s professional skills, independence and 
objectivity in the assessment of these models
3
.  
 
Aware of this need, the Basel 2 Accord (Basel Committee, 2004) has specified in a number of 
occasions that the supervisory authorities must employ the suitable resources and 
competencies suited to, (i) the assessment of the adequacy of the internal control systems 
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 As regards the orientation of the supranational supervisory authorities, towards the function of encouraging the 
spreading of the guiding principles of sound and prudent management, see the Basel Committee, 2004. 
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adopted, and (ii) the approval of the internal methods for determining the asset requirements 
related to credit and operational risks.  
 
This outlines a new role for the supervisory authority, that of “certifying body”, with respect 
to the consistency of the practises and models adopted by the single banks, on the one hand, 
and the principle of sound and prudent management and, specifically, the independent risk 
assessment requirements, on the other hand. 
 
The role of certifying body carries with it new operational duties and relationship models, 
between the supervisory authorities and the supervised entities, which imply an “active” and 
“driving” function by the former, in respect of regulatory compliance by the latter. This 
development corresponds to the growing need, by banks and financial intermediaries, of 
assistance in the implementation of the risk assessment and risk management processes. 
 
The importance of the supervisory authorities’ advisory role also emerges with regard to the 
control procedures put into place by the banks and, in particular, to the complex system of 
relations between the various internal and external auditing bodies. Regarding the operating 
mechanisms and information instruments on which the control functions are based, the Basel 
Committee assigns a guiding role to the supervisory authorities, which are called on to 
encourage the internal auditors - and, indeed, the structure as a whole - to adopt the necessary 
measures to ensure the effectiveness of the internal control system.  
 
The capacity to adequately perform advisory functions entails the existence of: (1) consistent 
objectives by both the supervisory authorities and the supervised entities, which is one of the 
basic principles of the consensual regulatory approach, in order to overcome the traditional 
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division between the two parties; (2) consistent knowledge, which allows both parties to 
clearly understand the business activities; and (3) consistent cultural models, especially as 
regards the basic values and means of communication. 
 
 
3. The organizational solutions for developing a common knowledge base, 
shared by banks and supervisory authorities 
 
Financial intermediaries and supervisory authorities may develop a common knowledge base 
by implementing coordination procedures, capable of encouraging the exchange of 
information and mutual interaction in problem analysis and solving (Mintzberg, 1985). These 
tools, which must be suited to the specific organization of the single banks, as well as to the 
specific coordination procedures
4
, fall into 4 categories:  
 
a) economic incentives; 
b) organizational structures; 
c) integratory mechanisms; 
d) information and communication flows. 
 
a) Economic mechanisms: incentives for supervisory compliance  
The parallel analysis of the Basel 2 proposals and the domestic regulations on internal control 
systems (Banca d’Italia 1998; 2002) highlights a significant inter-dependence between the 
two sets of regulations, whereby the latter is the necessary and indispensable premise of the 
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 Similar consideration, taking account of the specificity of the problem and, therefore, the nature of the 
proposed tools, have been formulated with reference to the issue of coordination between the supervisory bodies 
and the banks’ internal and external audit, in Schwizer 2005 
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former. What emerges, in fact, is a potential competitive edge for the banks that adopt a 
“compliant” interal control system, thus finding that, in this manner, they already possess 
most of the organizational requirements needed for the approval of the internal methods for 
determining capital requirements for credit and operational risks. According to the current 
supervisory arrangements, banks are encouraged to adopt a suitable and functional internal 
control system enabling them both to comply with the regulations set forth by the Bank of 
Italy, and to achieve savings in terms of regulatory capital.  
 
b) The organization of the internal control body: from functions to projects 
The adoption of an internal control system obliges banks to address the need to adopt process-
based organizational models, integrated with the basic functional or divisional structure, in 
order to identify the various risk-entailing micro-activities and the monitoring responsibilities.  
 
This requires the overhauling of the organizational structures and roles, by means of the 
introduction of communication flows and information collection systems across the structure, 
consistently with the types of risks for each business area. The result is a “quasi matrix” 
structure, in which the business responsibilities (formulating strategies and defining operating 
plans, and the related decision sustainability assessments, with respect to both the risks taken 
on and the available control systems) interact with those managing the various types of risks. 
 
Such an arrangement also affects the procedures for collecting and processing the risk-related 
information, and the consequent production of knowledge by the banks and other financial 
intermediaries. The functional activity-based logic is gradually replaced by a process or 
problem-based approach. 
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In order to ensure the effective performance of its supervisory activities by the supervisory 
authorities, according to an advisory approach (capable of assuring a basic understanding of 
the problems of the supervised entities), besides a shared viewpoint of the problems, it is also 
expedient to establish a symmetry between the abovementioned organizational structures 
(organizational units and responsibilities) and the supervisory structures.  
 
This means, on the one hand, enhancing the uniformity of the problems and risks related to 
the various business areas, rather than the similarity of organizational structures; and, on the 
other hand, scrapping the principal of function or activity-based supervision and moving 
towards a problem-based approach, which can be implemented by introducing “working by 
projects”, which can enable the supervisory authorities: (i) to extensively monitor the single 
types of risks - across the supervised entities’ structures and activities - developing the 
appropriate professional skills with respect to the single issues, and (ii) to propose cutting-
edge and innovatory proposals for solving new problems related to the single businesses. 
 
What ensues is a large-scale requirement of organizational flexibility within the supervisory 
authority, which can be met by introducing appropriate tools, not just of a technological 
nature - which, indeed, are necessary for collecting, transferring and processing the 
information, in support of the decision-making and supervisory processes - but also consisting 
of cross-company coordination bodies (committees, working groups, product, process and 
business area managers), associated with objective-based management systems and horizontal 
communications systems, aimed at promoting the sharing of information and goals and 
determining the accelerated creation of specialist skills.  
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These tools must be strengthened through the dissemination of cultural models inspired by the 
principles of cooperation and teamwork, and enhancing of the staff’s entrepreneurial spirit 
and participation in the development of services aimed at achieving maximum professional 
growth, to underpin both the effectiveness of the control activities, but also of the quality of 
the advisory services provided to its counterparts.  
 
As W.J. McDonough, President of the Federal Bank di New York, said recently, at the 
presentation of the new organizational structure of his control unit: “we’ve organized 
ourselves better, in order to share with you (the supervised entities) our point of view and our 
competencies, with respect to the best practices used by all financial institutions” 
(McDonough,  2003). 
 
c) Integration mechanisms: towards more efficient coordination
5
  
Within both the organization of the control authority and the broader supervisory system 
(which comprises the supervisory authorities, the supervised entities, the authorities 
supervising over connected industries, and the authorities of other countries), integration 
mechanisms can be put into place in order to enhance the informal solution of mutual 
adaptation (see the following paragraph e) and increase the flexibility, but also the 
systematicity, of relations between persons and, therefore, the efficiency of the decision-
making and problem-solving processes. These mechanisms may comprise: committees, task 
forces, integration managers (program or project managers).  
 
The Basel Committee adopts this solution explicitly, within the framework of the “Basel 2” 
(Basel Committee, 2004). With a view to supporting the implementation of the Accord, the 
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Committee has set up two integration bodies, respectively called the AIG (Accord 
Implementation Group) and CTF (Capital Task Force). The former is a committee composed 
of the representatives of the regulatory bodies of the various Accord-member countries, and is 
a forum where they can exchange information on the practical problems encountered in the 
application of the new arrangement, and on the relevant problem-solving strategies
6
. The 
latter is a working group of the Basel Committee, responsible for examining significant 
amendments to and interpretations of the New Accord. The Committee views these two 
bodies as key long-term tools, especially once the banks have started implementing the 
prescribed provisions. In particular, the CTF will take on the responsibility of analysing new 
banking products, and the implications that the developments in the risk management 
processes may have on the new arrangement, also after its entry into force. 
 
d) Information exchange and communications systems: knowledge management and 
supervision 
The indispensable tool for creating knowledge is the permanent and systematic exchange of 
information, at various levels: 
 
- between bank management and the banking supervisors;  
- between external auditors and the supervisors; 
- between the supervisors, with respect to different financial sectors, and between the 
authorities of different countries.  
 
With regard to item one, it is necessary to point out that the implementation of the internal 
control systems - in accordance with the requirements laid down in the Supervisory 
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 16 
Instructions at national level - has encouraged the intense exchange of information and 
documents (organizational regulations, strategic plans, audit plans, etc.), between the Bank of 
Italy and the single banks. 
 
The Basel Committee too has underlined, on a number of occasions, that the frequent 
exchange of information between the banks and the supervisors is fundamental for the 
effective implementation of the “Basel 2” Accord.  
 
With regard to item two, the specific provisions by the Basel Committee oblige the 
supervisors to cooperate and exchange information with the external and internal auditors, 
and to advise the banks on how the two bodies can cooperate. This cooperation is particularly 
important with a view to ensuring the efficiency and functionality of the overall system of 
internal control.  
 
The Committee points out that there is a complementary interest between the supervisors and 
the external auditors (Basel Committee, 2002), with special reference to the internal control 
system and information disclosure systems, which must justify a constant flow of information 
between the two bodies, and cooperation in monitoring the risks taken on by the single banks.   
 
With regard to item three, the exchange of information between the supervisors of different 
countries primarily concerns the cross-supervision of complex international banking groups, 
but also supervisory activities of different financial sectors, for the purpose of monitoring the 
risks in the banking groups and multibusiness financial risks.  
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The coordination process could also be functional for the improved allocation of resources 
and competencies for supervisory purposes: a more closer collaboration, in fact, would make 
it possible to support the supervisors in countries that lack the means to collect the necessary 
information for the effective implementation of the New Accord. With regard to this issue, 
principles have been developed aimed at encouraging closer practical cooperation and the 
exchange of information among the authorities (Basel Committee, 2003b).  
 
Therefore, also with regard to regulatory issues, the strategic importance of learning is 
asserted, which must be pursued through the integration of explicit and tacit knowledge, 
promoting the creation of “communities of practice” (Gherardi, 1999) and “communities of 
knowing” (Boland, Tenkasi, 1995), and enhancing the social dimension of knowledge. These 
perspectives are at the basis of the notion of “learning organization”, which aims at 
encouraging organizational learning and the creation of knowledge as key intangible assets 
and core competencies of a company. 
 
In order to improve knowledge management within the system and, in particular, in the 
extended community that includes the supervisors, it is necessary to accept and, therefore, 
strengthen the role of information, communication and knowledge as management and control 
tools. 
 
This means, first of all, accumulating and making available - within the network of 
organizational relations - the knowledge on corporate experience, by means of an extensive 
use of information techology.  
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Secondly, it is necessary to maximize consistency between the subject of the knowledge base 
and the manner of diffusion. The quality of knowledge management, in this case, can be 
recognized primarily in connection with the expected likelihood of the effective and efficient 
re-utilization of a certain “packaged” knowledge, i.e. in the fact that - once the knowledge 
transfer process has been activated - it may prove successful, translating into effective and 
efficient management behaviour.   
 
Thirdly, it is necessary to enhance access to and the transfer of knowledge. Knowledge can be 
transferred only if the following conditions are ensured: there must be trust between the 
parties; the parties concerned must be able to meet; they must, preferably, share the same 
language, or have a mutually accessible language; all the parties concerned must be motivated 
to exchange the information. All these pre-requisites may be more easily achieved if the 
system features a stable and strong culture (i.e. with a strong sense of identity), characterized 
by rules and systems of mutual relation, capable of consolidating the sense of belonging and 
sound principles of reciprocity.  
 
 
4.  The culture of banks and supervisory authorities: a measurement 
analysis model, within the framework of a “culture compliance” 
 
In the attempt to measure certain profiles of the current level of consistency of the knowledge 
base and cultural models, between supervisors and supervised entities, this paper focuses on 
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the cultural gap between the two parties, which is investigated by means of a text-analysis 
approach
7
.  
The study of corporate culture through language is a relatively new approach in economic 
literature. It is based on cultural anthropology, that is the methodologies for studying cultures 
based on the interpretation of their symbols and artifacts. The meaning ascribed to these 
aspects is subject to change, both in time, following evolutionary processes, and in respect of 
the cultural context taken into consideration. In this perspective, language may be considered 
a peculiar symbol and artifact of culture and, in consideration of the linguistic-textual 
differences when examining diverse cultural contexts, is a useful tool for understanding them. 
In the terms concerned by the paper, the issue has been only partially tackled in literature, and 
never with regard to financial institutions.  
Geertz (1973) speaks of culture in “semiotic” terms, when he maintains that his study “is not 
an experimental science in search of laws, but an interpretational science in search of 
meanings”. In a nutshell, he asserts the possibility of analysing social phenomena and 
organizational processes and behaviours by considering them as the symbols and artifacts 
typical of a cultural system. Schein (1985) identifies language as an artifact of the corporate 
culture and claims that it is possible to analyse the different cultures through the vocabularies 
they are capable of expressing. Wuthnow (1989) claims that the linguistic categories and 
lexical expressions typical of a certain context allow the analysis of different corporate 
cultures, because their definition is closely related to the vocabulary developed within them. 
Lastly, DiMaggio (1997, 2002) considers language the result of both social interaction and 
individual cognition. He maintains that, through the empirical analysis of written texts it is 
possible to determine the cultural aspects of language. This means that when the members of 
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 In the paper corporate culture is perceived as the set of values and decisions that represent the manner in which 
individuals can perform their activities within the organization, and defines which behaviours may be considered 
appropriate (Schein, 1985). 
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an organization use a term drawn from the vocabulary of their organization, what they’re 
really doing is making reference to an individual cognitive representation transformed into 
organizational behaviours shared by and common to the organization to which they belong 
(Rosa, Porac, 2002). As regards the role of vocabularies (Berger, Luckmann, 1967), of 
linguistic categories, it is further specified that - although in certain contexts it is 
(theoretically) possible to develop cultural categories even without a language - vocabularies 
play a very important role in their development and sharing (Levinson, 2003). 
All this implies that the analysis of culture is closely connected to the analysis of the type of 
vocabulary used by the members of an organization, which vocabulary is used in all the forms 
of communication, both oral and written, produced internally by that organization. The 
distinctive characteristics of every organization, therefore, are reflected in the documents it 
produces, and the language used may represent a key for their interpretation. 
In other words, if the organization leaves traces of its peculiar characteristics in the documents 
it produces, then it is possible to use text analysis to observe and “measure” these traces and 
determine their cultural implications.  
Based on this assumption, various surveys have been carried out in literature aimed at 
comprehending a series of issues concerning corporate culture, among which the research on 
the leadership characteristics within organizations (D’Aveni, MacMillan, 1990), the 
determinants of corporate reputation (Fombrun, Shanley, 1990), the measurement of the 
intensity of orientation to “corporate social responsibility” (Wolfe, 1991), the classification of 
the types of organization based on the existence and intensity of certain cultural values 
(Kabanoff, Holt, 1996). These studies have two objectives in common: 
 
- they provide representations of the content of the corpus of texts examined in the 
study; 
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- using them to extract information, i.e. several properties, through quantity-based 
measurements. 
 
Compared to the previous studies, this paper focuses on an evolutionary aspect of text 
analysis, concerning standardization in the treatment of data, combined with the use of 
standard vocabularies. This allows a greater comparability of the output of the various studies, 
enabling us to further refine the analysis methodology. 
The analysis model includes the definition of several key concepts, around which the banking 
culture develops (Carretta, 2001). These must represent key management aspects, with respect 
to the banks concerned, and the attention by the supervisors (table 1). This ensures that the 
same concepts are treated with high intensity and frequence in the examined documents. 
  
Table 1. Key concepts for the culture of both intermediaries and supervisory bodies 
 
Change 
Customer 
Innovation 
Risk 
Disclosure 
 
 
The model also makes reference to certain text analysis categories drawn from the Harvard IV 
Psychosocial Dictionary (Zull, Weber, Mohler, 1989) and the Lasswell Value Dictionary 
(Lasswell, Namenwirth, 1969), used as a gauge for the abovementioned key concepts. The 
different intensity of these categories, expressed in terms of “orientations”, characterizes the 
single concepts and allows us to compare the corporate culture against the various benchmark 
contests. Here we present the results of four orientations, among those surveyed, which are 
particularly significant for the parties in question (table 2): 
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- cognitive orientation, which represents the importance given to knowledge, to the 
evaluation or solution of a certain problem in the decision-making process; 
- disciplinary orientation, relating to the procedures with which a certain phenomenon 
is described and comprises a (more theoretical) academic profile, and a business 
profile, which implies a more management-based approach; 
- power orientation, which concerns the modalities of the organization, in terms of the 
propensity to share and cooperate, or in terms of importance of the hierarchy and 
according to individualist criteria; 
- value-based orientation, which represents the importance given by the organization to 
the achievement of results, as opposed to the respect of ethical values. 
 
 
Table 2. The main categories for measuring cultural orientations  
 
Cognitive orientation 
 
Knowledge 
Assessment  
Problem solving 
 
Disciplinary orientation 
 
Academic 
Business 
 
Power orientation 
 
Authority 
Cooperation 
 
Value-based orientation 
 
Results 
Ethics 
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5.  Survey methodology and main results  
 
The empirical assessment has been carried out in the phases as follows: 
- definition of the sample of banks to be analysed; 
- selection of the corpus to be analysed, for both the supervisory authority (the Bank of 
Italy) and the banks; 
- analysis of the “concordances”, in respect of the key concepts for the culture of the 
Bank of Italy and the banks
8
; 
- analysis of the context “occurrences”, in respect of the key concepts of the culture of 
the Bank of Italy and the banks
9
; 
- comparison of the context occurrences and the language categories extracted from the 
Harvard IV Psycho – Social Dictionary and the Lasswell Value Dictionary; 
- determination of the predominant cultural orientation and of the relevant intensity. 
 
The survey was carried out on a uniform and representative sample (86,3%, based on total 
assets) of the top fifteen banking groups in Italy. 
Consistently with the other text analysis applications, the selection of the corpuses concerned 
public documents (Bowman, 1984; D’Aveni, MacMillan, 1990; Kabanoff, Waldersee, Cohen, 
1995), such as financial reports, presentations and speeches by the top management of the 
single institutions. 
The study of the cultural differences was conducted over a period of four years (from 2000 to 
2003), according to a dynamic view of culture (Herskovits 1955). 
                                                 
8
 The analysis of concordances allows the extrapolation of all the words contained in a text, listing them in 
alphabetical order accompanied by a context that makes it possible to grasp their meaning, and by a series of 
indications allowing the retrieval and location of a passage within the structure of a text. 
9
 The analysis of occurrences allows the obtaining of lists of words making up a text, accompanied by the 
number of times in which they occur, besides the percentage compared to the total number of words. 
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For the text analysis proper, we used the Wordsmith 4 software developed by Oxford 
University (Scott, 1999). 
The analysis of concordance was carried out for each of the key concepts, so that the cultural 
analysis can be referred only to the terms that are actually associated with the key concepts. 
The last stage of the analysis concerned the comparison of the context occurrences of the key 
concepts and the vocabulary terms.  
The following formula was used to measure the intensity of the cultural orientation:  
 
Cultural Intensity Index
10
= (Cx – Cy)/(Cx + Cy) 
 
We use this formula in order to obtain an index value standardized for all categories and 
comprised between +1 and –1. In fact, an index values of +1 or –1 means that the text is 
entirely culturally oriented, as regards the analysed categories. The facility of representation 
of the results is, to such aim, one of the principal advantages of this tool. 
 
Regarding the survey results, the methodology highlights proof of differentiation between the 
culture of the Bank of Italy and that of the banks, but it also emphasizes some significant 
examples of reduction of the cultural gap over the survey period. The values of the surveyed 
items are given in Annex 1. 
 
Regarding the cognitive orientation (chart 1), the significance of the various components 
(knowledge, evaluation and problem solving) that guide the decision-making processes is 
constant over the survey period. In both the samples (banks and Bank of Italy) the problem-
                                                 
10
 If the Cultural Intensity Index > 0:  the cultural orientation tends to the category X; 
If the Cultural Intensity Index < 0:  The cultural orientation tends to the category Y; 
If the Cultural Intensity Index = 0 and Cx or Cy are different from 0:  The cultural orientation is neutral. 
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solving component is significant (accounting for about 40% of the cognitive model). On the 
contrary, the samples differ, albeit slightly, in the evaluation component, which appears larger 
for the banks (the gap 
is  about 10 basis 
points), and the 
component relating to 
knowledge of the 
phenomena, which 
decisively 
characterizes the orientation of the supervisor (with a weight of 40% and peaks of about 50% 
in the survey period).  
Chart 2. Discipline
-1
-0,5
0
0,5
1
2000 2001 2002 2003 2000-2003
Banks Bank of italy
Academy
Business
 
 
Regarding disciplinary orientation (chart 2), the business aproach prevails in the banks, while 
in the case of the Bank of Italy the textual analysis indicates a greater theoretical severity in 
representing the phenomena, typical of an academic approach.  
 
A further and significant difference concerns the orientation to cooperation, rather than 
authority (chart 3). Both the samples show a prevalence of the cooperative attitude in the 
Chart 1. Cognition
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2000-
2003
2000 2001 2002 2003 2000-
2003
Banks Bank of Italy
KNOW EVAL SOLVE
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analysis and representation of the phenomena in the survey texts. The figures show a limited 
prevalence of cooperation by the supervisory body, at least until recently, compared to a 
decidedly positive attitude in this direction by the banks. 
Chart 3. Power
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On the contrary, the last of the four cultural orientations taken into consideration, relating to 
the value given to the results, compared to a general concept of “business ethics”, shows a 
gradual closing of the gap between the two samples, both of which are characterized by a 
decided (even if of variable intensity) prevalence of ethical values (chart 4). 
Chart 4. Value
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Moving on to examine the importance assigned to the key concepts for the banking business 
by the two samples, a distinction can be made between the situations explainable in terms of 
role-related necessity, and situations in which the reasons for the gap are less straightforward. 
 
The first category includes the concepts of change, customer and innovation (charts 5-7). The 
different results achieved by the three factors may be explained, in fact, by the characteristics 
of the activities carried out by the two samples and the role each one plays, with respect to the 
represented phenomena. This would also explain why the values are substantially constant in 
time. 
Chart 5. Change
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Chart 6. Customer
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How can we assess the marked propensity inferable from the supervisor’s documents, in 
terms of change and innovation? On the one hand, it is assumed that the authority has played 
a decisive role, in the past, in ferrying innovation into the system, thus encouraging the 
adoption of new types of businesses, new management models, new systems of objectives. On 
the other hand, with less positive overtones, it can be underlined how it has permanently 
monitored the sector, repeatedly surveying the various aspects, the strong current of change 
under way, and following step by step an innovatory process whose principal players are the 
single financial intermediaries. 
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Chart 7. Innovation
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Cultural gaps that are less easy to explain concerning the concepts of risk and disclosure 
(charts 8 and 9). The significant difference given to the two concepts highlights a problem of 
non-shared judgements and determines the need to reduce the surveyed gap. 
Chart 8. Risk
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Chart 9. Disclosure
0,0%
2,0%
4,0%
6,0%
8,0%
10,0%
2000 2001 2002 2003
Banks Bank of Italy
 
 
In actual fact, in the surveyed period, one can notice a trend proceeding in the same direction 
for these key concepts. This is especially true with regard to risk, where the gap features a 
constant and gradual downward trend. With regard to disclosure, the differences are still 
substantial, although there is a growing attention in connection with the major financial 
scandals.  
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6. Conclusions 
 
Bank regulation models and supervisory approaches have changed significantly. The new 
relationship models between the supervisory authorities and the banks must be supported by 
organizational tools capable of fostering the sharing of information and promoting the 
advisory function of the supervisors. The new role of the supervisory bodies requires 
significant consistency between the knowledge bases and cultural models with the supervised 
entities.  
The paper represents a first attempt made to measure the cultural gap between the two groups 
of stakeholders, through a text analysis model. This approach does not exhaust the perspective 
of cultural analysis, but it does open up a broad field of survey and suggests further 
investigation, also by means of ethnographical tools.   
In the terms of the paper, the issue has been only partially explored in literature and never 
with respect to financial institutions.  
The contribution of this paper concerns three aspects, two relating to content and one to 
method. Firstly, the results highlight several significant cultural gaps, relating to important 
issues for the development of the system and the activities of the single banks, such as risk, 
disclosure, change and innovation. The different focus on these concepts in the examined 
texts points out the opportunity of identifying new opportunities of comparison between the 
two parties and promoting the exchange of information and knowledge, as the basis for the 
improved sharing of objectives and guidelines.  
Secondly, there has been a gradual convergence of certain orientations, primarily in 
consequence of the Bank of Italy moving towards the cultural models of the banks. This 
means a virtuous trend towards a common cultural development. However, it is necessary to 
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enhance this trend by the banks too, which can be fostered by the full implementation of the 
internal control systems.  
Thirdly, from a methodological point of view, the significance of the cultural analysis in the 
reference industry can be highlighted. Therefore, it is expedient to develop this line of study, 
which can be done by applying the model in question to increasingly “internal” corpuses of 
texts and firm-specific documents, such as circular letters and internal service orders, 
organizational regulations and other materials reflecting the day-to-day performance of the 
corporate activities, for the purpose of bringing closer the survey method to the characteristics 
typical of ethnographical studies of culture. 
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Annex 1. Final results on Disclosure, Customer, Innovation, Change, Risk measured on 
Banks and on Bank of Italy  
 
Year INSTITUTION KEY CONCEPT Cognition 
Academic (X) 
vs.  
Business (Y) 
Authority (X) 
vs.  
Cooperation (Y) 
Result (X)  
vs.  
Ethic (Y) 
   know eval solve    
2000 Bank of Italy Disclosure 0,60 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,50 -1,00 
2001 Bank of Italy Disclosure 0,40 0,20 0,40 -0,14 0,50 -0,67 
2002 Bank of Italy Disclosure 0,33 0,22 0,44 1,00 0,60 -1,00 
2003 Bank of Italy Disclosure 0,50 0,17 0,33 0,50 1,00 -0,67 
2000 Banks Disclosure 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 -1,00 
2001 Banks Disclosure 0,33 0,33 0,33 -1,00 0,00 -1,00 
2002 Banks Disclosure 0,20 0,40 0,40 -0,71 -1,00 -1,00 
2003 Banks Disclosure 0,30 0,40 0,30 -0,20 -1,00 -0,60 
2000 Bank of Italy Customer 0,27 0,27 0,45 -0,20 -0,33 -1,00 
2001 Bank of Italy Customer 0,50 0,13 0,38 0,20 1,00 -1,00 
2002 Bank of Italy Customer 0,43 0,14 0,43 0,00 -0,33 -1,00 
2003 Bank of Italy Customer 0,36 0,09 0,55 0,33 -0,50 -1,00 
2000 Banks Customer 0,32 0,32 0,36 -0,39 -0,33 -0,43 
2001 Banks Customer 0,36 0,27 0,36 -0,44 -0,09 -0,43 
2002 Banks Customer 0,42 0,25 0,33 -0,21 -0,33 -0,27 
2003 Banks Customer 0,48 0,26 0,26 -0,24 -0,09 -0,27 
2000 Bank of Italy Innovation 0,27 0,36 0,36 0,06 -0,50 -0,75 
2001 Bank of Italy Innovation 0,36 0,36 0,27 -0,11 0,00 -0,71 
2002 Bank of Italy Innovation 0,43 0,29 0,29 -0,14 -0,20 -0,43 
2003 Bank of Italy Innovation 0,44 0,11 0,44 0,27 -0,33 -0,67 
2000 Banks Innovation 0,50 0,00 0,50 -0,45 -0,33 -1,00 
2001 Banks Innovation 0,33 0,33 0,33 -0,40 -1,00 0,33 
2002 Banks Innovation 0,33 0,33 0,33 -0,11 -1,00 -0,33 
2003 Banks Innovation 0,50 0,13 0,38 -0,47 -0,20 -1,00 
2000 Bank of Italy Change 0,25 0,25 0,50 0,00 0,00 0,00 
2001 Bank of Italy Change 0,13 0,38 0,50 0,33 -1,00 0,00 
2002 Bank of Italy Change 0,29 0,29 0,43 0,00 0,00 -1,00 
2003 Bank of Italy Change 0,50 0,25 0,25 0,20 -1,00 0,00 
2000 Banks Change 0,13 0,13 0,75 0,00 -1,00 -1,00 
2001 Banks Change 0,33 0,17 0,50 -1,00 -1,00 0,00 
2002 Banks Change 0,29 0,14 0,57 -0,60 -1,00 0,00 
2003 Banks Change 0,11 0,22 0,67 -0,20 -1,00 0,00 
2000 Bank of Italy Risk 0,63 0,13 0,25 0,00 0,00 -1,00 
2001 Bank of Italy Risk 0,57 0,14 0,29 0,50 0,00 -1,00 
2002 Bank of Italy Risk 0,50 0,25 0,25 0,33 0,00 -1,00 
2003 Bank of Italy Risk 0,56 0,11 0,33 0,33 0,00 0,00 
2000 Banks Risk 0,42 0,23 0,35 -0,26 0,09 0,00 
2001 Banks Risk 0,40 0,32 0,28 -0,22 0,11 0,14 
2002 Banks Risk 0,38 0,31 0,31 -0,33 0,27 -0,17 
2003 Banks Risk 0,37 0,30 0,33 -0,19 0,00 -0,33 
2000 Banks Average score 0,27 0,33 0,39 -0,02 -0,32 -0,69 
2001 Banks Average score 0,35 0,29 0,36 -0,61 -0,40 -0,19 
2002 Banks Average score 0,32 0,29 0,39 -0,39 -0,61 -0,35 
2003 Banks Average score 0,35 0,26 0,39 -0,26 -0,46 -0,44 
2000-
2003 Banks Average score 0,33 0,29 0,38 -0,32 -0,45 -0,42 
2000 Bank of Italy Average score 0,40 0,24 0,35 0,01 -0,07 -0,75 
2001 Bank of Italy Average score 0,39 0,24 0,37 0,16 0,10 -0,68 
2002 Bank of Italy Average score 0,40 0,24 0,37 0,24 0,01 -0,89 
2003 Bank of Italy Average score 0,47 0,15 0,38 0,33 -0,17 -0,47 
2000-
2003 
 
Bank of Italy Average score 0,42 0,22 0,37 0,18 -0,03 -0,69 
